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ARTICLE
After the AUMF
__________________________
Jennifer Daskal* & Stephen I. Vladeck**

Introduction***
On September 18, 2001, one week after the deadliest terrorist
attacks in U.S. history, President George W. Bush signed into law the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”). The AUMF authorized
the President:
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts
of international terrorism against the United States by such
nations, organizations or persons.1
Although its delegation of power to the President was sweeping, the
AUMF in fact reflected a compromise between Congress and the Bush
Administration, which had sought an even broader and more open-ended
grant of authority. Even as fires continued to burn at Ground Zero, Congress
pushed back, only authorizing military force against those who could be

* Assistant Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. B.A.,
Brown University, 1994; B.A., University of Cambridge, 1996; M.A., University of
Cambridge, 2001; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2001.
** Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Scholarship, American University Washington
College of Law. B.A., Amherst College, 2001; J.D., Yale Law School, 2004.
*** For helpful conversations, feedback, and support, special thanks go to Rosa Brooks,
Sarah Cleveland, David Cole, Wells Dixon, Rebecca Ingber, Harold Koh, Martin
Lederman, Wendy Patten, and Andrea Prasow.
1 Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
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tied to the groups directly responsible for the September 11 attacks.2 Thus,
despite widespread misrepresentations to the contrary,3 Congress pointedly
refused to declare a “war on terrorism.” The use of force Congress
authorized was instead directed at those who bore responsibility for the 9/11
attacks—namely, al Qaeda and the Taliban. It was also for a specific
purpose: preventing those “nations, organizations, or persons” responsible
for the September 11 attacks from committing future acts of terrorism
against the United States.
Over a dozen years later, the AUMF—which has never been
amended—remains the principal source of the U.S. government’s domestic
legal authority to use military force against al Qaeda and its associates, both
on the battlefields of Afghanistan and far beyond. But even as the statutory
framework has remained unchanged, the facts on the ground have evolved
dramatically: the Taliban regime in Afghanistan—behind which al Qaeda
had taken refuge—has been removed from power; Osama bin Laden has
been killed; the remaining masterminds of 9/11 are either deceased or in
U.S. custody; and, perhaps most importantly, the “ranks” of al Qaeda have
been “decimated,” to quote former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, 4 such
that it no longer poses the threat that it did in the weeks and months before
and after September 11.
This is not to suggest that the United States has eliminated the
terrorist threat. To the contrary, a number of tragic events, including recent

2

The authorization initially proposed by the Bush Administration included the broad-based
authority to “deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the
United States.” David Abramowitz, The President, the Congress, and Use of Force: Legal
and Political Considerations in Authorizing Use of Force Against International Terrorism,
43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 71, 73–75 (2002). Congress rejected the Administration’s initial
proposal as overbroad and instead crafted a resolution targeted at those responsible for the
September 11 attacks, and those countries harboring the responsible parties. Id. at 74–75.
3 See, e.g., Grenville Byford, The Wrong War, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 2002, at 34
(“Wars have typically been fought against proper nouns (Germany, say) for the good reason
that proper nouns can surrender and promise not to do it again. Wars against common
nouns (poverty, crime, drugs) have been less successful. Such opponents never give up.
The war on terrorism, unfortunately, falls into the second category.”).
4 Hon. Leon Panetta, Sec’y of Def., “The Fight Against Al Qaeda: Today and Tomorrow,”
Speech Before the Center for a New American Security (Nov. 20, 2012), available at http://
www.cfr.org/defense-strategy/panettas-speech-al-qaeda-november-2012/p29547, [http://
perma.law.harvard.edu/088s3gtTLhg].
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attacks in Boston,5 Algeria,6 and Kenya, 7 underscore the extent to which
terrorists—both self-radicalized individuals and organized groups—
continue to present a threat to U.S. persons and interests, both at home and
overseas. But in an area of law and policy in which there is seldom deep
consensus, the one point upon which all seem to agree is the increasing
extent to which those who threaten us the most are not those against whom
Congress authorized the use of force in September 2001. This has led some
to call for a new AUMF.8
One widely discussed proposal is that contained in a Hoover
Institution white paper by Robert Chesney, Jack Goldsmith, Matthew
Waxman, and Benjamin Wittes. Titled “A Statutory Framework for NextGeneration Terrorist Threats,” the paper proposes a new statute wherein
“Congress sets forth general statutory criteria for presidential uses of force
against new terrorist threats but requires the Executive Branch, through a
robust administrative process, to identify particular groups that are covered
by that authorization of force.”9 Modeled on the existing process for State
5

See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Nat’l Def. Univ. (May 23,
2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarkspresident-national-defense-university, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/02qzrZuZiXw]
(describing the Boston Marathon bombings as being carried out by radicalized individuals,
operating independent of al Qaeda).
6 See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Charges Algerian in Deadly Gas Plant Attack, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2013 (describing a former leader of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb as
being deemed responsible for the January 2013 attack on a gas plant in Algeria that killed
dozens).
7 See, e.g., Nicholas Kulish and Jeffrey Gettleman, U.S. Sees Direct Threat in Attack at
Kenyan Mall, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2013 (describing al Shabaab as being responsible for
the September 2013 attack on a Kenyan mall that killed over sixty civilians).
8 See, e.g., The Law of Armed Conflict and the Use of Military Force, Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Armed Servs., 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Sen. McCain) (“[T]he fact is,
that this authority [under the AUMF] . . . has grown way out of proportions and is no
longer applicable to the conditions that prevailed, that motivated the United States
Congress to pass the authorization for the use of military force that we did in 2001.”); id.
(“Wouldn’t it be helpful to—to the Department of Defense and the American people if we
updated the AUMF to make it more explicitly consistent with the realities today, which are
dramatically different from [sic] they were on that fateful day in New York?”); id.
(statement of Sen. King) (“I’m not disagreeing that we need to attack terrorism wherever it
comes from and whoever’s doing it. But what I’m saying is let’s do it in a constitutional
way, not by putting a gloss on the document that clearly won’t support it.”).
9 R OBERT C HESNEY ET AL ., H OOVER I NST ., A S TATUTORY F RAMEWORK FOR N EXT
GENERATION TERRORIST THREATS 10 (2013), available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/
default/files/documents/Statutory-Framework-for-Next-Generation-Terrorist-Threats.pdf,
The authors are all members of the Hoover Institute’s Task Force on National Security and
the Law.
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Department designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (“FTOs”), 10 the
proposal would have Congress enact a new blanket framework statute
authorizing the use of military force against as-yet-undetermined future
terrorist organizations, and delegate to the Executive Branch the authority to
designate those organizations against which such force may be used if and
when the relevant criteria are met.11 If press reports are accurate, the Hoover
paper is but one of a number of competing proposals that have been
circulated in favor of a “new”—or, at least, expanded—AUMF.12
This Article offers an alternative vision for the future of U.S.
counterterrorism policy. We start from the fundamental premise that, as
Secretary of Homeland Security and former Department of Defense
(“DoD”) General Counsel Jeh Johnson said in a speech in late 2012, war
should “be regarded as a finite, extraordinary and unnatural state of affairs”
that “violates the natural order of things.”13 In Johnson’s words: “Peace
must be regarded as the norm toward which the human race continually
strives.”14
With that animating principle in mind, we explain in the pages that
follow that the future of U.S. counterterrorism policy should be one in
which use-of-force authorizations are a last, rather than first, resort. Given
the evolving sophistication of our law enforcement and intelligencegathering tools over the past decade, along with the President’s settled
powers under both domestic and international law to use military force in
self-defense, the burden should—indeed, must—be on those seeking
additional use-of-force authority to demonstrate why these existing
10

See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012) (making it a crime to
knowingly provide material support to a designated FTO).
11 See Greg Miller & Karen DeYoung, Administration Debates Stretching 9/11 Law To Go
After New al-Qaeda Offshoots, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2013, at A1 (summarizing debates
within the Obama Administration over the scope of the AUMF).
12 See, e.g., Andrew Rosenthal, Revisiting Post-9/11 Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2013, http://
takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/07/revisiting-the-a-u-m-f/, [http://
perma.law.harvard.edu/0E68urVY75o]; Juana Summers, Thornberry: Fix Post-9/11 Use of
Force Rule, POLITICO, May 10, 2013; see also Counterterrorism Policies and Priorities:
Addressing the Evolving Threat, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 113th
Cong. (2013).
13 Hon. Jeh Charles Johnson, General Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., “The Conflict Against
Al Qaeda and its Affiliates: How Will It End?,” Speech Before the Oxford Union (Nov. 30,
2012), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/11/jeh-johnson-speech-at-theoxford-union/, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/06hrMWJpiRE].
14 Id.
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capacities are inadequate. And even then, any use-of-force authority should
be enacted by Congress only after public debate and extensive deliberation,
carefully calibrated to the specific threat posed by an identifiable group, and
limited in scope and duration—much as Congress seemed to recognize in its
initial response to the President’s proposed authorization to use force in
Syria15 —so as to avoid making the very mistake that Congress so
assiduously sidestepped after September 11.
In short, calls for a new framework statute to replace the AUMF are
unnecessary, provocative, and counterproductive; they perpetuate war at a
time when we should be seeking to end it. Congress certainly may choose,
as it did in the AUMF, to authorize the use of military force against specific,
organized groups so as to address an established and sustained threat that
existing authorities are inadequate to quell. But until and unless the political
branches publicly identify a group that poses such a threat, the many other
counterterrorism tools at the government’s disposal—including law
enforcement, intelligence-gathering, capacity-building, and, when
necessary, self-defense capabilities—provide a much more strategically
sound (and legally justifiable) means of addressing the terrorist threat. 16
In what follows, we provide background on the AUMF and its
interpretation over time (Part I), explain why the Hoover proposal and other
calls for an expanded AUMF are unnecessary and unwise (Part II), and
outline three alternative approaches for the next generation of U.S.
counterterrorism policy (Part III).
I. Background
A. The AUMF, al Qaeda, and the Taliban

As noted above, Congress in the AUMF rejected alternative
15

See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, Limitless Wars: A Lesson from 9/11 for Syria (and Vice-Versa),
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY BLOG (Sept. 11, 2013), available at http://
www.acslaw.org/acsblog/limitless-wars-lessons-from-911-for-syria-and-vice-versa, [http://
perma.law.harvard.edu/0CLwjVkYCwG].
16 See, e.g., Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations, Remarks to a Security Council Briefing on Counterterrorism (Mar. 13, 2013),
available at http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/209314.htm, [http://
perma.law.harvard.edu/058xpaVfUzg] (describing the multi-pronged approach to
combating terrorism in Africa).
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language proposed by the Bush Administration that would have authorized
the broad-scale use of force to punish those responsible for September 11
and “deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression against
the United States.”17 Instead, Congress chose its words carefully, focusing
only on those “nations, organizations, or persons” that the President
“determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks
that occurred on September 11, 2001.”18 Shortly after he signed the AUMF
into law, President Bush confirmed what by then had been widely reported:
that convincing evidence identified the responsible parties as al Qaeda and
the Taliban.19
From its inception, then, the AUMF was not an open-ended force
authorization; it was a specific authorization to use military force against
those entities that attacked the United States on September 11: al Qaeda, the
Taliban, and, by interpretation, the so-called co-belligerents of these
organizations.20 Congress did not authorize hostilities against a common
noun, but a proper one.21 Moreover, as the Supreme Court later emphasized
in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, such force was only
authorized to the degree it was consistent with the traditional incidents—
and international laws—of war.22
This understanding has been the driving force behind the past
decade of U.S. counterterrorism policy. Thus, regardless of where they have
been arrested, terrorism suspects who are not part of al Qaeda, the Taliban,
or associated forces have consistently been prosecuted in U.S. courts,

17

Abramowitz, supra note 2 (citing AUMF § 2(a), 115 Stat. at 224) (emphasis added); see
147 CONG. REC. S9950-51 (daily ed., Oct. 1, 2001) (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd)
(providing the text of the administration’s initial proposal); id. at S9949 (“[T]he use of
force authority granted to the President extends only to the perpetrators of the September
11 attack. It was not the intent of Congress to give the President unbridled authority . . . to
wage war against terrorism writ large without the advice and consent of Congress. That
intent was made clear when Senators modified the text of the resolution proposed by the
White House to limit the grant of authority to the September 11 attack.”).
18 AUMF § 2(a), 115 Stat. at 224.
19 President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United
States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11 (Sept. 20, 2001), in 2 PUB.
PAPERS at 1347, 1347–48.
20 See infra Part II.B.
21 See, e.g., Byford, supra note 3, at 34.
22 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594–95 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 519–21 (2004) (plurality opinion).

2014 / After the AUMF

121

transferred to other countries for trial, or released.23 Conversely, all three
branches of the U.S. government have agreed that anyone who is a member
of al Qaeda or the Taliban can be detained without charge, and also,
according to the views of the past two administrations, subject to lethal
force in appropriate circumstances.24 The AUMF has thus been the principal
source of authority for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and, so far as
can be gleaned from public reports, targeted killing operations in Pakistan,
Yemen, and Somalia.25
Over twelve years after the AUMF was signed into law, we have
also witnessed a significant shift in the threat landscape. The entity that
attacked the United States on September 11, 2001—what is often described
as “al Qaeda core”—has been effectively eviscerated. It is a group President
Obama describes as “a shadow of its former self,”26 and which the Director
of National Intelligence described in testimony before Congress as being
23

See, e.g., Greg Miller & Karen DeYoung, Administration Debates Stretching 9/11 Law
To Go After New al-Qaeda Offshoots, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2013, at A1 (noting that law of
war authorities pursuant to the AUMF do not extend beyond al Qaeda, the Taliban, and
associated forces; the key debate, then, is over the scope of “associated forces”). Moreover,
others who are covered by the AUMF were prosecuted by federal, civilian court—at times
as a precondition for extradition. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Dutch Citizen Pleads Not Guilty to
Terrorism Charges, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2007 (describing prosecution in civilian court as
a precondition to the extradition of Wesam al-Delaema).
24
See, e.g., John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. and
Counterterrorism, Remarks at Woodrow Wilson Int’l Ctr. for Scholars: The Ethics and
Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy (Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://
www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy, [http://
perma.cc/5UNE-3HXA] (emphasizing that “individuals who are part of al-Qaida or its
associated forces are legitimate military targets”); see also National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021(b)(1), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562; Al Adahi
v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2010). See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack
Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2047 (2005) (explaining the central role of the AUMF in debates over most of the Bush
Administration’s counterterrorism policies).
25 See, e.g., The White House, Presidential Letter – 2012 War Powers Resolution 6-Month
Report (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter War Powers Report], available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/presidential-letter-2012-war-powersresolution-6-month-report, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0VwpeBCCmqy] (describing
“direct action” taken in Somalia and Yemen); Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made
Legal Case To Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2011, at A1, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/middleeast/secret-us-memo-made-legal-case-to-killa-citizen.html?pagewanted=all, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0R6rwWuo6E7/].
26 President Barack H. Obama, State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/13/us/politics/obamas-2013-state-of-the-unionaddress.html, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0anmdWrVzui].
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“probably unable to carry out complex, large-scale attacks in the West.”27 At
the same time, the Taliban has been removed from power in Afghanistan,
with the impending withdrawal of U.S. ground troops heralding in a new
phase in U.S. policy there.
Increasingly, then, legal and policy debates over the AUMF have
focused less and less on al Qaeda’s core and the Taliban, and more and more
on those groups and other actors that had nothing to do with the September
11 attacks, but nonetheless pose threats to U.S. interests today. The debate
over the future of the AUMF has become one dominated by a discussion of
“associated forces,” that is, the question of which entities qualify as “cobelligerents” of al Qaeda and are therefore covered by the AUMF even if
they were not themselves responsible for September 11. This debate, in
turn, revolves around two distinct but inter-related questions: (1) the
appropriate scope and identification of associated forces; and (2) the
purported need for new use-of-force authorities to neutralize threats that
cannot be appropriately subsumed under the notion of associated forces.
And both of these inquiries are dramatically complicated by the
government’s lack of transparency as to which groups qualify as associated
forces.28
B. The Problem of “Associated Forces”
Most modern wars have involved more than two parties. Thus, in
World War II, the United States was not just at war with Germany, Italy, and
Japan; rather, the United States was also at war with their “co-belligerents,”
for example, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, among others.29 The Bush
and Obama Administrations have also applied this notion of co-belligerency
to the conflict authorized by the AUMF. Thus, whereas Congress in the
AUMF referred only to “those nations, organizations, or persons [the
President] determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
27

See Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Cmty.: Statement for the
Record Before the S. Select Comm. On Intelligence, at 4 (2013) (statement of Hon. James
R. Clapper, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence), available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/
130312/clapper.pdf, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0PMpMeHxzVq].
28 See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 8 (witnesses from the Department of Defense offering to
provide the Senate Armed Services Committee with the list of “associated forces” but
declining to answer suggestion that it be made public).
29 See, e.g., Declarations of War Against Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, chs. 323–25, 56
Stat. 307 (1942).
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attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons,”30 the past two administrations—with subsequent
ratification by Congress with respect to detention authority 31—have
understood this language to encompass not just al Qaeda and the Taliban,
but also those groups that are “associated forces” thereof. As Jeh Johnson
explained in a 2012 speech, the U.S. government defines an associated
force as an (1) “organized armed group” that is (2) “a co-belligerent with al
Qaeda in the hostilities against the United States and its coalition
partners.”32
A key difference is that Congress declared war against the United
States’ co-belligerent enemies in World War II, whereas the Executive
Branch has, since 2001, read co-belligerents into the AUMF without ever
going back to Congress for subsequent authorization. In fact, it has refused
to publicly acknowledge what groups qualify as associated forces, asserting
that doing so would “inflate” that group’s recruitment efforts. 33 Not only
does such a justification seem unconvincing—after all, potential members
would be on alert that the Pentagon considers the group and its members
legitimate lethal targets, which, among other things, would make
membership in the group a dangerous proposition—but there is something
highly undemocratic about the President engaging the nation in a long-term
conflict without disclosing to the public who the enemy is.34

30 AUMF

§ 2(a), 115 Stat. at 224.
See FY2012 NDAA § 1021(b)(2), 125 Stat. at 1562 (authorizing detention of “[a] person
who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that
are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any
person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid
of such enemy forces”).
32 See Johnson, supra note 13.
33 See Cora Currier, Who are We at War With? That’s Classified, PROPUBLICA, July 26,
2013, available at http://www.propublica.org/article/who-are-we-at-war-with-thatsclassified, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0VDu9hkuti] (citing Pentagon spokesperson, Lt.
Col. Jim Gregory: “Because elements that might be considered ‘associated forces’ can
build credibility by being listed as such by the United States, we have classified the list . . .
we cannot afford to inflate these organizations that rely on violent extremist ideology to
strengthen their ranks.”).
34 For an excellent critique of the United States’ justification for keeping the list of
“associated forces” secret, see Jack Goldsmith, DOD’s Weak Rationale For Keeping Enemy
Identities Secret, LAWFARE, July 26, 2013, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/07/dodsweak-rationale-for-keeping-enemy-identities-secret/, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
0wbGpQiLUrT].
31

124

Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 5

Thus, while certain entities and individuals clearly fall outside of the
Administration’s definition of “associated forces” (for example, a group of
two or more terrorists with no direct affiliation with al Qaeda, such as the
two brothers responsible for the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing; or entities
that share ideological affinities with al Qaeda but do not engage in any
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners), there is a total
lack of transparency as to who is covered. Even with respect to al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (“AQAP”), the government has never clarified
whether operations against its members are covered by the AUMF because
they are deemed to be “part of” al Qaeda or because the group qualifies as
an “associated force.”35
Public statements by DoD officials have only served to confuse
matters more, suggesting that there may be a long list of covered groups—
while remaining unclear as to whether such references are to “associates”
covered by the AUMF or “affiliates” that fall under a separate (heretofore
non-public) definition that have ties with al Qaeda, but are not in fact
subsumed under the 2001 AUMF.36 As a result, there is no clarity as to
which, if any, of the many groups operating in the tribal areas of Northwest
Pakistan qualify, or whether and under what circumstances entities such as
al Shabaab, 37 al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (“AQIM”), or the Nusra
Front—or parts of such groups—might also be encompassed within the
definition of “associated forces.”
35

See Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum of
the United States in Support of Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss at 1, al-Aulaqi v. Obama,
727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (“The United States has further determined that AQAP is
an organized armed group that is either part of al-Qaeda, or is an associated force, or
cobelligerent, of al-Qaeda. . . .”).
36 See Hearing, supra note 8.
37 While the United States has acknowledged taking “direct action” against members of al
Shabaab who are also members of al Qaeda, see War Powers Report, supra note 25, it has
never stated whether al Shabaab itself is deemed covered by the AUMF. See also Marty
Lederman, The Capture of Abu Anas and an Attack on an al Shabaab Leader, JUST
SECURITY (Oct. 6, 2013, 9:48 AM), available at http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/06/captureabu-anas-al-liby-attack-shabaab-leader/, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0czfdcu6SMS]
(suggesting that the main target of the October 5, 2013 operation in Baraawe, Somalia was
deemed a member of al Shabaab who was also a member of al Qaeda and could therefore
be targeted under the same rationale). For an argument that the AUMF should not be
expanded to cover al Shabaab absent congressional debate and explicit authorization, see
Jennifer Daskal & Steve Vladeck, Westgate, al Shabaab, and the AUMF, JUST SECURITY
(Sept. 23, 2013, 6:15 AM), available at justsecurity.org/2013/09/23/westgate-al-shabaabaumf/, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0FViTj1uCik].
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The pervasive secrecy surrounding the government’s application of
that concept has led some to speculate that the Executive Branch will
simply subsume “extra-AUMF” cases within the existing AUMF
framework, shoehorning emerging threats into the increasingly outdated
ambit of the original statute simply by labeling the groups that pose them as
“associated forces.”38 Were this to happen, the government could—despite
the incapacitation of those responsible for the September 11 attacks and the
pending withdrawal of all U.S. ground troops from Afghanistan—seek to
rely on the AUMF as authority for offensive military operations in Mali,
Syria, or Somalia, even if the targets were not also deemed members of al
Qaeda, to say nothing of operations in other corners of the globe with loose
affiliations with al Qaeda and little to no connection to the September 11
attackers. 39
To be clear, we are not suggesting that this shift has already taken
place. Indeed, we do not and would not know if it did, as the list of covered
groups remains classified.40 There is, however, relatively widespread
agreement that such a shift would be unsatisfactory.41 The more that the
AUMF is used to justify the use of military force against those with no
connection to the September 11 attacks and the ensuing armed conflict, the
more it becomes an essentially limitless authorization, allowing the
President to use force as a matter of first resort in a wide range of conflicts,
untethered to the self-defense justification for the post-9/11 use of force,
and irrespective of constitutional limits that give Congress, not the
Executive, the authority to declare war.42 As we explain in Part II below,
38

See, e.g., CHESNEY ET AL., supra note 9, at 4 (“[I]n a growing number of circumstances,
drawing the requisite connection to the AUMF requires an increasingly complex daisy
chain of associations—a task that is likely to be very difficult (and hence subject to debate)
in some cases, and downright impossible in others.”).
39 Indeed, at a 2013 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, Robert Taylor, Acting
General Counsel of the Department of Defense, stated that the AUMF could authorize
lethal force against al Qaeda’s associated forces in places as far-flung as Mali, Libya, and
Syria. See Hearing, supra note 8.
40 See id. Despite offering an expansive interpretation of what the AUMF would permit, the
Administration has not yet stated that it does extend to groups engaged in mostly local
conflicts in places such as Mali, Libya, and Syria. See, e.g., id. (indicating that the
Pentagon was “looking very hard” at the Syria-based al Nusra Front, but had not yet
defined it as an “associated force” of al Qaeda).
41 See, e.g., Miller & DeYoung, supra note 11 (“U.S. officials said administration lawyers
are increasingly concerned that the law is being stretched to its legal breaking point, just as
new threats are emerging in countries including Syria, Libya and Mali.”).
42 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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this is not an appropriate interpretation of the statute, and it is not an
appropriate exercise of presidential power. If new groups emerge that pose a
threat sufficient to warrant independent use-of-force authority, the
government should affirmatively and publicly identify them and obtain
from Congress specific authorization to use force against those groups. If, in
contrast, no special use-of-force authority is needed to respond to these
groups, then this only underscores our more fundamental point: that a new,
expanded AUMF is unnecessary.
The proponents of the Hoover proposal, however, have seized upon
an alternative possibility: in their view, the government will seek to use
force against so-called “extra-AUMF” threats regardless of the underlying
statutory authorization. They rely upon this presumed fact, coupled with a
concern about the lack of transparency as to which groups fall within the
AUMF, to justify a new approach presented as a moderate solution:
Congress delegates to the President the power to identify those groups
against which military force is necessary pursuant to specific statutory
criteria. In other words, Congress delegates its war-declaration authority to
the Executive Branch, subject to specified criteria. The proposal further
requires such delegations to be public—with ex post auditing and reporting
to address the current transparency deficit. As the Hoover proposal
concludes:
a listing system modeled on this approach best cabins
presidential power while at the same time giving the
president the flexibility he needs to address emerging threats.
Such a listing scheme will also render more transparent and
regularized the now very murky process by which
organizations and their members are deemed to fall within
the September 2001 AUMF.43
The Hoover proposal thus rests on a view—which we share—of the
insufficient transparency of the identification of “associated forces.” Its
solution, however, is a new use-of-force regime in which Congress enacts a
wholesale delegation to the President of the power to identify the groups
against which armed conflict is authorized, rather than case-by-case
authorizations of such force by Congress.
43

CHESNEY ET AL., supra note 9, at 10.
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Although we agree that greater transparency and accountability are
necessary limitations on the government’s scope of authority to use force
against “associated forces” under the AUMF, we fail to see how the
transparency concern justifies the type of open-ended or broad force
authorizations that the Hoover paper advocates.44 To the contrary, as we
explain below, such an approach rests on two assumptions that we
vigorously dispute: that an expansive and expanding war is inevitable and
that no alternative means exist for achieving a comparable result. Indeed,
not only do such alternatives exist, but an ever-expanding armed conflict
paradoxically threatens to make the nation less safe in the long term.
II. The Case Against Open-Ended Authority to Use Force
The underlying assumption behind the Hoover proposal and other
similar undertakings seems to be that expansion, not curtailment, of the
military response to terrorism—including the targeted killing program and
detention without charge—is required to keep the nation safe. These efforts,
however, should be rejected for at least five reasons.
First, it is not at all clear that the threat these “extra-AUMF”
groups pose has evolved to justify a new declaration of armed conflict;
notably, the Executive not only is not saying it is needed, but the President
has recently spoken about the possibility of “refin[ing], and ultimately
repeal[ing]” the AUMF’s mandate.45 Second, repeated claims to the contrary
notwithstanding, law enforcement tools, coupled with international
counterterrorism cooperation, capacity building of partner states, and
strategic initiatives to reduce violent extremism, are and have proven to be a
highly effective means of deterring, incapacitating, and gathering
intelligence from terrorists; they can, and should, be the tools of first resort
against these groups and their members. Third, to the extent that law
enforcement tools are insufficient to prevent terrorist attacks against U.S.
interests in a particular circumstance, the President’s self-defense
authorities, appropriately applied, should provide more than adequate
authority to take necessary action. Fourth, if an organized armed group
emerges that poses the type of sustained, intense threat that justifies a
44

Other proposals floating behind the scenes in Congress also reportedly rest on the need
for new, broad-based force authorizations. See Rosenthal, supra note 12; Summers, supra
note 12; Hearing, supra note 12.
45 Remarks of the President at Nat’l Def. Univ., supra note 5.
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declaration of armed conflict, Congress can pass a new and appropriately
circumscribed authorization to use military force—just as it did with the
AUMF. Fifth, and most importantly, it is not at all clear that the expanded
use of military force as a matter of first resort achieves the United States’
ultimate security goal of protecting the nation from terrorist threats; to the
contrary, it likely undermines it.
A. The Evolving Nature of the Threat
The push for a new AUMF is premised on the notion that, as the
Hoover paper puts it, although the “original objects of the AUMF are dying
off, newer terrorist groups that threaten the United States and its interests
are emerging around the globe.”46 We agree with this claim. The threat the
United States faces from terrorism has not been and cannot be eliminated.
As President Obama quite eloquently put it:
Neither I, nor any President, can promise the total defeat of
terror. We will never erase the evil that lies in the hearts of
some human beings, nor stamp out every danger to our open
society. What we can do—and must do—is dismantle
networks that pose a direct danger, and make it less likely
for new groups to gain a foothold, all while maintaining the
freedoms and ideals that we defend. 47
But while we need to do what we can to minimize the terrorist
threat, it does not necessarily follow that wartime authorities are needed or
are the preferred tools for doing so. Although threats no doubt persist, it is
not yet evident that any particular emerging terrorist group poses the kind of
threat that requires an open-ended authorization of military force and the
invocation of the laws of armed conflict, that is, the kind of threat to the
United States that al Qaeda posed on September 11. In fact, according to the
Director of National Intelligence’s recently released Intelligence
Community Worldwide Threat Assessment, only AQAP is described as
having the intent and capacity to launch attacks on the U.S. homeland.48
This is not to say that other terrorist groups are less dangerous; as the recent

46

CHESNEY ET AL., supra note 9, at 1–2.
Obama, supra note 9, at 1–2.
48 See Clapper, supra note 27, at 3–4.
47
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attacks in Kenya and Algeria illustrate, they are perhaps only more so. But
their immediate focus appears, at least based on the available information,
to be local and regional, rather than directed at the U.S. homeland. And
although reasonable people may disagree about whether it should be the
policy of the United States to use military force to prevent acts of terrorism
against our overseas allies, there is no question that the AUMF adopted a
much narrower lens—and predicated the use of force on the threat
specifically faced by the United States. At the very least, the decision to
engage law of war tools and to justify the use of force as a first resort
against new, emergent threats—many of which appear to be focused on
regional targets—should be made after public discussion and debate, just as
happened with regard to al Qaeda and the Taliban in the days after the 2001
attacks.
Meanwhile, it is worth remembering that under well-established
rules of international law, a threat alone does not trigger an armed conflict
absent hostilities that reach a certain threshold level of intensity involving
an organized, armed group.49 This is for good reason; if any group of violent
criminals triggered an armed conflict, virtually every nation-state would be
in a perpetual state of war. A declaration of armed conflict against a long
and/or open-ended list of emerging terrorist groups undermines the
important distinction between war and peace, as well as the efforts to cabin
war that have been the heart of the international community’s collective
engagement since the end of the Second World War. Simply put, such an

49

See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-91-1, Decision on Defence Motion of
Interlocutlary Appeal on Jurisdiction, par. 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995); see also Laurie Blank & Geoffrey Corn, Losing the Forest Through the
Trees: Syria, Law, and the Imperatives of Conflict Recognition, 46 VAND. J. INT’L L. 693,
737 (2013) (persuasively critiquing the international community’s interpretation and rigid
application of the Tadic ruling, yet arguing for a totality of the circumstances test that
makes these factors the “essential guideposts”).
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approach would change the default from peace to war.50 As President
Obama put it: “Unless we discipline our thinking and our actions, we may
be drawn into more wars we don’t need to fight, or continue to grant
Presidents unbound powers more suited for traditional armed conflicts
between nation states.”51
1. The Expansion of Law Enforcement Capacities and Capabilities since
2001
Claims to the contrary notwithstanding, law enforcement tools,
coupled with other counterterrorism capabilities, are—and have proven to
be—effective in dealing with a wide array of terrorist threats, including
those also subject to military force under the AUMF. According to the
Department of Justice’s own statistics, for example, the United States has
successfully prosecuted approximately 500 terrorists over the past decade in
our ordinary civilian courts, including several dozen who were apprehended
overseas and/or arguably had connections to al Qaeda or its affiliates.52
More than just taking dangerous terrorists off the streets, these
arrests and prosecutions have also been the source of valuable intelligence
about terrorist groups and their operations, due in part to the strong
incentives for defendants to provide accurate, reliable information in

50

Even if it is not the intention of the Hoover proposal’s authors, experience under the FTO
designation process suggests that the list of groups with which the United States is engaged
in an armed conflict would grow, not shrink, over time—with every incentive pushing the
Executive to expand, not curtail its own the authority to use force; both the Executive and
Congress are loath to delist groups that might someday pose a risk of harm, and there is
little to no meaningful opportunity to correct flaws in either the process or substance of
individual designations. Cf. United States v. Afshari, 446 F.3d 915, 917–22 (9th Cir. 2006)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (critiquing FTO designation
process). But see Jack Goldsmith, Response to Jennifer and Steve on Statutory Authority
and Next Generation Threats, LAWFARE, Mar. 18, 2013, http://www.lawfareblog.com/
2013/03/response-to-jennifer-and-steve-on-statutory-authority-and-next-generation-threats,
[http://perma.law.harvard.edu/06kBkYoSkaA] (asserting that the Hoover proposal contains
“stricter substantive and temporal limits than the unilateral Executive Branch expansions of
the AUMF combined with unilateral Article II authorities”).
51 Remarks by the President at Nat’l Def. Univ., supra note 5.
52 These statistics come from Department of Justice data obtained by Human Rights First in
response to a FOIA request (on file with authors).
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exchange for plea deals.53 Recent examples include Ibrahim Suleiman
Adnan Adam Harun, an al Qaeda operative who was captured in Italy last
year, extradited to the United States, and is reportedly cooperating with
investigators;54 David Headley, who committed to continued cooperation
after providing valuable information about the terrorist organization
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Pakistan-based terrorist leaders prior to being
sentenced to thirty-five years for his role in the 2008 terrorist attack in
Mumbai and another planned, but thwarted attack, in Denmark;55 and
Ahmed Warsame, who was captured off the coast of Yemen in 2011,
transferred to the United States after a short period of military detention,56
and reportedly provided the government extensive intelligence and evidence
prior to pleading guilty to providing material support to terrorism, among
other charges. Even more recently, the United States has prosecuted Abu
Ghaith, Osama bin Laden’s son-in-law, who was taken into custody in
Jordan in February 2013, in federal civilian court in New York for
conspiring to kill Americans abroad;57 and Abu Anas al Libi, who was
captured in Libya in October 2013, and, like Warsame, was held for a brief

53

See, e.g., David S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. NAT’L
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 1, app. 1 at 80–95 (2011) (providing examples of intelligence
obtained from terrorism targets in law enforcement custody between approximately 1998
and 2010).
54 Mosi Secret, Man Charged with Plotting Against U.S. Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
2013, at A28.
55 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, David Headley Sentenced to 35 Years in Prison for Role in Indian
and Denmark Terrorist Attacks, Jan. 24, 2013, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/January/
13-nsd-104.html, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0NZteyyTbTi/]; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fact
Sheet: The Criminal Justice System as a Counterterrorism Tool, Jan. 26, 2010, http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/January/13-nsd-104.html, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
0M49iTd2zQJ].
56 This initial sixty day period of military detention appears to be justified as permissible
under the AUMF. Absent the AUMF, or some other basis for allowing an initial period of
law-of-war detention in such circumstances, the sixty day delay in presentment would be
difficult to justify, and perhaps even unconstitutional. See generally County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
57 U.S. Att’y Office, S.D.N.Y., Guilty Plea Unsealed in New York, Mar. 25, 2013, http://
www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2013/guilty-plea-unsealed-in-new-york-involvingahmed-warsame-a-senior-terrorist-leader-and-liaison-between-al-shabaab-and-al-qaeda-inthe-arabian-peninsula-for-providing-material-support-to-both-terrorist-organizations,
[http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0toP4TLTTUr/].
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period in military detention before being transferred to civilian court where
he is facing trial for his role in the 1998 Embassy bombings.58
To be sure, as critics will be quick to point out, law enforcement did
not stop the September 11 attacks. But this response is a red herring,
particularly when one considers just how much our counterterrorism
capacities have increased over the past decade.59 Since 2001:
·

58

The so-called Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) wall,
which was sharply criticized by the 9/11 Commission for inhibiting
the sharing of intelligence and law enforcement information and
thereby contributing to pre-September 11 law enforcement
failures,60 has come down. Thanks to amendments included in the
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, FISA now explicitly permits the
coordination of law enforcement and intelligence officials to protect
against acts of international terrorism,61 and various statutory
reforms over the past decade have only further facilitated such
interagency cooperation. 62

See Marc Santora & William K. Rashbaum, Bin Laden Relative Pleads Not Guilty in
Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/03/09/nyregion/sulaiman-abu-ghaith-bin-ladens-son-in-law-charged-in-newyork.html, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0ZPTeP8gsM7/].
59 We do not express a view as to the merits of this or any of the other authorities listed
herein; rather, our aim is to illustrate the range of “peacetime” law enforcement and
intelligence gathering tools at the government’s disposal under existing law and doctrine
that do not depend upon the existence of any ongoing armed conflict. We leave the debate
over the proper scope of these authorities for another day.
60 See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 78–80, 270–72 (2004).
61 See 18 U.S.C. § 1806(k); see also Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (2001) (overruling the “primary
purpose” doctrine, pursuant to which FISA had been interpreted to require that “the
purpose” of FISA surveillance be to collect foreign intelligence information, and replacing
it with a requirement that foreign intelligence be a “significant purpose” of such
surveillance).
62 See generally JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RES. SERV., THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION AND TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/terror/R41780.pdf, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0Fn2A2S4HkZ/] (describing the
enhanced investigative tools, authorities, and capabilities provided and employed by the
FBI since September 11, 2001).
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The FISA Amendments Act (“FAA”) of 2008 further authorized the
government, albeit not without significant controversy,63 to engage
in the warrantless interception of communications that take place in
the United States if the targets are foreigners overseas.64 Senator
Dianne Feinstein, Chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence
Committee, has described FISA-related authorities as having
“produced and continu[ing] to produce significant information that
is vital to defend the nation against international terrorism and other
threats”—including information relied upon in making recent
terrorism-related arrests.65 The Director of the National Security
Agency recently asserted that programs initiated pursuant to the
FAA authorities and a separate business records provision66 have

Thanks in large part to the Snowden disclosures, there is an active and ongoing debate
about the scope and nature of such surveillance activities carried out by the U.S.
government. See, e.g., James G. Carr, A Better Secret Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/opinion/a-better-secret-court.html, [http://
perma.law.harvard.edu/0U2R8pPXA5r] (suggesting the need to introduce an adversarial
process into the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court). But this debate, while important,
is immaterial for present purposes; the relevant point is that these authorities do exist, and
are much more robust today than they were on September 11, 2001.
64 A separate 1998 amendment, further refined in 2001 as part of the PATRIOT Act, allows
the government to seek a FISA court order requiring production of documents or other
tangible things when they are relevant to an authorized national security investigation. This
provision has been the source of significant controversy, given recent revelations that it has
been relied on to authorize the bulk collection of telephonic metadata. See, e.g., Press
Release, U.S. Senate, Udall, Wyden Propose Limiting the Federal Government’s Ability to
Collect Vast Amounts of Data from Americans (June 14, 2013); cf. Letter from Peter J.
Kadzik, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Rep. F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. (July 16, 2013) (defending bulk collection of telephonic metadata),
a v a i l a b l e a t h t t p : / / w w w. l a w f a r e b l o g . c o m / w p - c o n t e n t / u p l o a d s / 2 0 1 3 / 0 7 /
ag_holder_response_to_congressman_sensenbrenner_on_fisa.pdf , [http://
perma.law.harvard.edu/0bGM9WChGUe/]. As this Article went to press, a federal district
court judge in Washington, D.C., issued a preliminary injunction against the metadata
program, holding that there is a substantial likelihood that the program violates the Fourth
Amendment. See Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0851, 2013 WL 6571596 (D.D.C. Dec. 16,
2013). Eleven days later, a different federal judge reached the opposite conclusion. See
ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13-3994, 2013 WL 6819708 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013). Both
decisions were subsequently appealed.
65 Ellen Nakashima, Senate Approves Measure to Renew Controversial Surveillance
Authority, WASH. POST., Dec. 28, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/senate-approves-measure-to-renew-controversial-surveillance-authority/
2 0 1 2 / 1 2 / 2 8 / 4 3 5 3 9 0 5 c - 5 0 f c - 11 e 2 - 8 b 4 9 - 6 4 6 7 5 0 0 6 1 4 7 f _ s t o r y. h t m l , [ h t t p : / /
perma.law.harvard.edu/0rJbb4UGzzQ].
66 Philip Bump, The Senate Presses the NSA’s Buttons on the Record, Even While Trying
Not To, THE WIRE, June 12, 2013, http://www.thewire.com/politics/2013/06/nsa-senateappropriations-committee-hearing/66177/, [http://perma.cc/0hdFVjJaAbD].
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helped to thwart a plot to blow up the New York Stock Exchange,
among others.67

67

·

Substantive criminal laws have evolved to respond to the changing
nature of the threat. Material support statutes, for example, which
have been interpreted broadly, 68 were expanded to cover overseas
conduct in October 2001, with further expansions in 2004.69
Additional substantive expansions to these laws were also added in
2004, including the addition of a new crime of “receiving militarytype training from a foreign terrorist organization.”70

·

In 2009, the High-Value Intelligence Group (“HIG”) was put into
effect for the purposes of designing and conducting intelligence
interviews of high-value terrorism detainees. The HIG pulls together
the expertise of top intelligence professionals across the
government, including from the FBI, CIA, and DoD, so as to
maximize the effectiveness of the intelligence interviews.71

See Courtney Kube, NSA Chief Says Surveillance Program Helped Disrupt 54 Plots,
NBC N EWS , June 27, 2013, available at http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/
2013/06/27/19175466-nsa-chief-says-surveillance-programs-helped-foil-54-plots?lite,
[http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0ea23nNHZdX/]; Josh Gerstein, Prism Stopped NYSE
Attack, POLITICO, June 18, 2013, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/nsa-leak-keithalexander-92971.html, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0753z7xbuZE/]. Subsequently, the
government clarified that it could only identify one specific attack that had been thwarted
by these authorities. See, e.g., Charlie Savage & David E. Sanger, Senate Panel Presses
N.S.A. on Phone Logs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2013, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/08/01/us/nsa-surveillance.html?pagewanted=all, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
0eU1BEd9bq6/].
68 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (upholding 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B against First and Fifth Amendment challenges).
69 See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (“IRTPA”), Pub. L. No.
108-458, § 6603(d), 118 Stat. 3638, 3763 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d)); USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 805(a)(1)(F), 115 Stat. at 377 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a)).
70 See IRTPA § 6602, 118 Stat. at 3761–62 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339D).
71 See, e.g., Carol Cratty & Pam Benson, Special Terror Investigation Group Used 14 Times
in the Last Two Years, CNN SECURITY BLOG, Mar. 7, 2012, available at http://
security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/07/special-terror-interrogation-group-used-14-times-inlast-two-years/, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0uTRMJTcfdN/].
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·

Federal courts have recognized an expanded “public safety”
exception to Miranda to allow for the limited introduction into
evidence of unwarned statements. 72

·

An increasing cohort of judges and civilian prosecutors has
successfully navigated the handling of classified information.
Examples include the recent closed-door arraignment of three
European men apprehended en route to Yemen and accused of
supporting al Shabaab 73 and the extensive handling of classified
information in the prosecution of Ahmed Ghailani, now serving a
life sentence for his role in the 1998 embassy bombings.74 Other
examples abound.75

·

Meanwhile, widely cited fears about the potential harm of bringing
high-profile terrorism suspects into federal court have proven
baseless. Not a single terrorist trial has been attacked, and not a
single terrorism suspect or convict has escaped.

To be sure, intelligence gathering capacities are still imperfect, as
the November 2009 Fort Hood shootings, April 2013 Boston Marathon
bombings, and September 2013 attack on Kenya’s Westgate mall showed all
too harshly. But these episodes underscore a critical point lost on many
critics: this is a problem that affects law enforcement and military uses of
force alike. Where the government does have knowledge of a threat to the
72

See, e.g., United States v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 111, 115–21 (2d Cir. 2000) (upholding
questioning of terrorism suspect pursuant to public safety exception); United States v.
Abdulmutallab, No. 10-20005, 2011 WL 4345243 (E.D. Mich., Sept. 16, 2011) (relying on
the public safety exception to Miranda in rejecting motion to suppress statements obtained
under fifty minutes of unwarned questioning).
73 See U.S. Atty’s Office, E.D.N.Y., Three Supporters of Foreign Terrorist Organization al
Shabaab Charged in Brooklyn Federal Court, Face Life in Prison, Dec. 21, 2012, http://
www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2012/three-supporters-of-foreign-terroristorganization-al-shabaab-charged-in-brooklyn-federal-court-face-life-in-prison, [http://
perma.law.harvard.edu/0rNdspfNVKu/].
74 See Benjamin Weiser, Ex-Detainee Gets Life Sentence in Embassy Blasts, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 2011, at A18, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/nyregion/26ghailani.html,
[http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0TSSFouSiqf/].
75 See, e.g., United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008). See generally Steve
Vladeck, The National Security Courts We Already Have, JOTWELL, Sept. 23, 2013,
http://courtslaw.jotwell.com/the-national-security-courts-we-already-have/ (reviewing a
Federal Judicial Center report that exhaustively documents the experiences of postSeptember 11 U.S. federal courts in handling high-profile terrorism prosecutions).
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nation’s security, law enforcement tools have proven to be effective in both
incapacitating threatening actors and gathering intelligence that can help
thwart other attacks.
2. The President’s Unquestioned Self-Defense Authorities
Our support of law enforcement tools notwithstanding, we do not
claim that the law enforcement approach is the only possible response to
terrorism, or that the nation’s hands are tied if law enforcement tools are
unavailable (given the location of the individual) or ineffective (given the
scale or nature of the threat). To the contrary, we recognize the possibility
that groups or individuals will come to light that pose a significant,
strategic, and imminent threat that the criminal law cannot adequately
address. But if and when this situation presents itself, the Executive has the
authority and the responsibility to act.
Indeed, it is well settled that the President has the authority under
Article II of the U.S. Constitution and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter to take
immediate—and, where necessary, lethal—action in defense of the nation in
response to an “armed attack.”76 As the Supreme Court has explained: “If a
war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only
authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war,
but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special
legislative authority.”77 President Bush would have required no statute to
shoot down the planes headed to the World Trade Center on September 11;
President Obama would have required no statute to defend U.S. diplomats
from attack in Benghazi. The failure to do so in either tragic episode was
not the result of insufficient authority, but insufficient intelligence in
advance of the attacks—a problem that is in no way solved by an expansive
declaration of armed conflict.

76

Although Article 51 refers to the right of self-defense in response to an “armed attack,”
most scholars agree that this does not require a nation to wait until the attack has already
occurred and encompasses the right to respond to an imminent attack as well, although
there is significant debate about what constitutes “imminence.” UN CHARTER, art. 51; see
Ashley Deeks, Unable or Unwilling: Toward a Normative Framework for Extra-Territorial
Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L LAW 483, 492 n.23 (2012).
77 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863).
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Take the type of situation with which the Hoover proposal seems
most concerned: a terrorist organization that does not neatly fall within the
AUMF but is poised to carry out a lethal attack on the U.S. homeland or
U.S. persons at some point in the near future from a part of the world in
which nonmilitary means of thwarting the attack are unavailable. In such a
situation, the President could—and should—take action, consistent with the
international law requirements of necessity and proportionality, without
waiting for a new congressional authorization to use force. We, too, worry
about such a scenario, but we fail to see why, on those facts, self-defense
authorities would be inadequate. Moreover, to the extent that the response
requires an extended engagement with the threatening organization, the
President should—and, some would argue, must, under the War Powers
Resolution78—obtain specific statutory authorization to address the specific
threat.
Nor do we think, as the Hoover proposal authors suggest, that this
approach merely will result in an expansive view of self-defense that itself
provides an outlet for the inevitable uses of force that would be legitimized
through a new authorization.79 Rather, we think that self-defense—properly
defined—provides a critical, and necessary, means of safeguarding the
nation against those truly dangerous and imminent threats that cannot
reasonably be dealt with using alternative means, without also authorizing
the broad-scale use of force against all members of a threatening group or
their close associates. 80
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See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548.
In his essay Postwar, Robert Chesney similarly argues that U.S. targeting authority will
look pretty much the same whether it is engaged in an armed conflict or acting in selfdefense. But as Chesney also acknowledges, this is because as a matter of policy, the
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Other so-called “soft-constraint mechanisms” are likely, in our opinion, to have greater
effect than Chesney acknowledges. See Robert M. Chesney, Postwar, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC.
J. 305, 333 (2014).
80 In a future article, we aim to set out in more detail a comprehensive understanding of the
limits of the President’s self-defense authorities under Article II of the Constitution. See
GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING HUMANITY: WHEN FORCE IS
JUSTIFIED AND WHY (2008) (looking at this issue from an international law perspective).
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3. Congress’s Ability to Pass a Group-Specific AUMF If and When It Is
Needed
Moreover, if and when an organized armed group poses the type of
sustained, significant threat justifying the affirmative declaration of an
armed conflict, nothing would or should stop Congress from providing a
narrow and specific authorization to use force against that group, just as it
did within three days of the September 11 attacks. The proposal to bypass
Congress and instead delegate such future—and momentous—decisions to
the President lacks any historical precedent, and for good reason. It is
Congress, not the Executive, that is given the authority under our
Constitution to declare war. 81 As our Founding Fathers understood well, an
authorization to use military force is a measure that should be undertaken
solemnly, after public debate and with buy-in from representatives of a
cross-section of the nation, based upon a careful and deliberate evaluation
of the nature of the specific threat. It should not be an ex ante delegation to
the President to make unreviewable decisions to go to war at some future
date against some as-yet-unidentified entity. The proposal to delegate such
force authorizations to the President threatens the carefully calibrated
balance of powers enmeshed within the Constitution, essentially asking
Congress to surrender one of its most important functions to the Executive.
The Hoover proposal counters that Congress cannot be expected to
act with sufficient dispatch: “Congress probably cannot or will not, on a
continuing basis, authorize force quickly or robustly enough to meet the
threat, which is ever-morphing in terms of group identity and in terms of
geographic locale.”82 And yet, there are no cases in which Congress either
could not or would not provide the necessary authority in response to a
grave threat to our security—or why, in the interim, the President’s Article
II authorities, criminal laws, and other existing counterterrorism authorities
were not sufficient to meet the threat. Until and unless Congress is besieged
with requests to authorize the use of military force against a range of
terrorist groups—each of which presents a threat akin to that posed by al
Qaeda a decade ago—and fails to act on them, it is difficult to see why casespecific use-of-force authorizations would be inadequate.
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
CHESNEY ET AL., supra note 9, at 10.
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4. Why a New AUMF Would Also Be Unwise
Our analysis has to this point focused on the many reasons why a
new AUMF is not needed. Such a measure would also be counterproductive
and unwise. An open-ended declaration of armed conflict carries with it the
likely exercise of increased force and actually runs the risk of undermining
our principal counterterrorism goal: protecting this and future generations of
Americans from the threat of international terrorism.
In testimony before a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Farea al-Muslimi, a freelance journalist from Wassab, Yemen,
provided a stark reminder of this risk. Al-Muslimi painted a vivid
description of the ways in which a 2013 drone strike in his village invoked
terror of the United States. As he put it: “Had the United States built a
school or hospital, it would have instantly changed the lives of my fellow
villagers for the better and been the most effective counterterrorism tool.”83
Instead, he warns that the strikes are strengthening AQAP’s standing and
undercutting U.S. security: “AQAP recruits and retains power through its
ideology, which relies in large part on the Yemeni people believing that
America is at war with them.”84
Al-Muslimi is not alone in his views. He is joined by General
Stanley McChrystal, former commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan;
General James E. Cartwright, former Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chief of
Staff; and Admiral Dennis Blair, former Director of National Intelligence—
all of whom have warned of the ways in which excessive reliance on uses of
force in general, and targeted killings in particular, can increase or

83

Drone Wars: The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killings,
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil
Rights, and Human Rights, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Farea Al-Muslimi), available
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otherwise engender resentment toward the United States.85 These men echo
the lessons of the U.S. Army’s Counterinsurgency Manual, which describes
the recuperative power of insurgent groups, the impossibility of killing
every insurgent, and the potential counterproductive consequences of such
attempts.86
Other counterproductive consequences include the risks of further
destabilizing already unstable regimes, increased international
condemnation, and the very real possibility of reduced counterterrorism
cooperation as a result. Already, there are indications that some key allies
are nervous about providing the United States with intelligence information
that might be used as a basis for drone strikes.87 In fact, Germany reportedly
restricted the type of information it can pass on to its American counterparts
in response to concerns about its intelligence being used to support what it
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87 See, e.g., Ravi Somaiya, Drone Strike Prompts Suits, Raising Fears for U.S. Allies, N.Y.
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deemed to be illegitimate drone strikes.88 Meanwhile, it sets a disturbing
precedent for other sovereigns—strengthening the claims of Russia and
China, among others, to use force as a matter of first resort against any
member of groups they deem to be “terrorist,” broadly defined. 89
III. The Better Way Forward
Ultimately, we ought to be having a discussion not about how to
perpetuate the conflict that al Qaeda began, but about how to end that
conflict and shift away from a permanent state of war. To that end, we urge
policymakers to consider three possible alternatives:
A. A More Transparent AUMF
For all of the reasons described in Part I, the AUMF (coupled with
law enforcement and intelligence tools and backstopped by the President’s
inherent Article II authorities) has proven to be a more-than-adequate basis
for addressing the threat posed by organized terrorist groups since
September 11. To the extent there have been failures, they have resulted
from gaps in intelligence, not authorities. Should an organized armed group
emerge that cannot adequately be dealt with through these existing
authorities, the President would be able to ask for, and Congress would be
in a position to grant, authorization to deal with the threat posed by that
specific group. Notably, the Obama Administration does not appear to think
that such a situation exists at the present and is not asking for new,
expanded authority. To the contrary, President Obama has explicitly warned
against it, stating that he would “not sign laws designed to expand [the
AUMF’s] mandate further;” rather, he looks forward to working with
Congress to “refine, and ultimately repeal, the AUMF’s mandate.”90 Never
88
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with US Intelligence, DER SPIEGEL, May 17, 2011, available at http://www.spiegel.de/
international/germany/drone-killing-debate-germany-limits-information-exchange-with-usintelligence-a-762873.html, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0bawJQzWc72/].
89 John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism,
Remarks at the Harvard Law School Program on Law & Security: Strengthening our
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before has Congress declared war against an enemy when the President has
not asked it to do so.
That said, as noted above, we share others’ concern about the lack of
transparency in how the AUMF is being interpreted, especially with regard
to which groups qualify as “associated forces.” Such secrecy flies in the
face of the most fundamental aspect of the rule of law—fair notice—while
also generating suspicion and distrust. The American public should be
aware of, and consequently be able to publicly discuss and debate, the
groups that we are fighting as part of the armed conflict with al Qaeda.
Meanwhile, innocent civilians should be given the benefit of notice as to
which groups qualify as the enemy in this conflict, thereby allowing them to
take steps to disassociate themselves from those groups (and the members
thereof) with which the United States deems itself to be in an armed
conflict. Either the President should take it upon himself to make public any
determination that a particular group qualifies as an associated force of al
Qaeda or the Taliban under the AUMF, or Congress should demand such
public disclosure. This is one of the “refine[ments]” that the Obama
Administration should be working toward.
B. An Afghanistan-Based AUMF Sunset
Another option would be for Congress to write a sunset provision
into the AUMF—one that is tethered to the withdrawal of forces from
Afghanistan, currently scheduled for the end of 2014. 91 This approach has
appeal, given the range of concerns about an open-ended and everexpanding armed conflict without an identifiable battleground or core center
of operations. The long lag time before the authorities actually sunset would
provide the Executive ample opportunity to determine what, if any,
additional authorities are needed to deal with the threat posed by organized
terrorist groups, and Congress ample time to respond. 92
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A sunset provision has the obvious benefit of making clear to our
allies and the pool of would-be terrorist recruits that, more than twelve
years after September 11, the United States is not engaged in, or seeking to
engage in, a state of perpetual war. More significantly, it also drives home
the larger point that at some point, perhaps soon, the conflict Congress
authorized in September 2001 will effectively have run its course. And, in
fact, the President has himself suggested that he is open to the possibility of
repeal. The Executive could, of course, treat the AUMF as lapsed, even
without legislation formally so providing.
One issue that arises with the approach, however, is the question of
the Guantánamo detainees. With the formal cessation of hostilities comes
the end of the authority to detain under the laws of war, which is the basis
for the Guantánamo detentions. While this will be a cause for celebration
for many, it is likely to be a cause of concern for some members of
Congress and the Executive. A 2009 review conducted by the Obama
Administration concluded that of the 240 detainees then still at
Guantánamo, some four dozen were deemed “too dangerous to release” but
ineligible for prosecution given defects in the scope of specific criminal
laws at the time of their capture and/or evidentiary concerns.93 While
conditions may have changed since that assessment was made, and some
reasonable “wind-down” authority will almost certainly be permitted,94 at
some point the authority to detain will cease, given an end to the underlying
armed conflict.
That said, the fear of that day—and the government’s interest in
continued detention pursuant to the laws of war—ought not be the reason
for the continuation of the armed conflict. Wars justify detention of enemy
armed forces. Detention cannot and should not justify war; that would be a
perverse example of the tail wagging the dog. Moreover, with advance
93 See
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planning, it would probably be feasible to negotiate deals to keep detainees
of particular concern under close surveillance, so long as we could find a
nation to take them.
It is worth noting, however, that this issue may soon arise whether or
not Congress formally sunsets the AUMF. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,95 the
Supreme Court concluded that the authorization to use force includes the
authority to detain; a plurality of the court also warned that “[i]f the
practical circumstances of a given conflict [meaning boots on the ground]
are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of
the law of war, that understanding may unravel.”96 With the withdrawal of
troops from Afghanistan, the relevant practical circumstances will have in
fact changed and may yield a turning point with respect to the Guantánamo
detainees (especially those whose detention is based upon ties to the Taliban
rather than al Qaeda), regardless of whether the AUMF sunsets.
Another possible consequence of repeal is the elimination of a
possible short-term period of military detention prior to federal court
prosecution, as was employed in the two cases of Ahmed Warsame,
captured in the Gulf of Aden in 2011, and Abu Anas al-Libi, captured in
Libya on October 5, 2013. Again, however, the arguable advantages of such
hybrid law-of-war and law enforcement operations cannot and should not
provide the basis for continuing the war. If there is a demonstrated need for
presentment delay in a limited set of terrorism cases, Congress and the
administration should consider a narrow legislative fix—and should not
perpetuate an entire armed conflict to achieve such a limited goal.97
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C. Repeal and Replace
A final, albeit suboptimal, option would be to repeal the AUMF and
replace it with an AQAP-specific authorization. So long as the AUMF
remains on the books, AQAP’s apparent inclusion as an “associated force”
provides authority for the United States to use military force against it, and
thereby moots the need for an AQAP-specific statute. But if Congress were
to pursue an AUMF sunset or if the current AUMF were otherwise
determined to have lapsed, it is possible that the Obama Administration
would pursue such an authorization, given that AQAP is the one terrorist
group currently deemed to have the capacity and intent to launch attacks on
the U.S. homeland, according to the recent Intelligence Community
Worldwide Threat Assessment.98 At least in this unclassified form, however,
even this threat is qualified. As the Assessment describes, AQAP leaders
will have to “weigh the priority they give to U.S. plotting against other
internal and regional objectives,” along with limits on the number of their
members who are in a position to operationalize U.S. attacks.”99
In any event, such an authorization should only be adopted after
public debate and discussion, based on legislative determinations that
AQAP poses the type of sustained, intense threat that justifies the
application of law-of-war tools, and that a declaration of armed conflict is in
the nation’s best security interests. If the facts (and the public) support it, an
AQAP-specific authorization would be the type of narrow and specific
authorization that we have argued for throughout, and would be far
preferable to the more expansive (if not potentially limitless) proposals also
under consideration. Other possible candidates for a narrow authorization
might ultimately include al Shabaab or other emergent groups, but much
more discussion and debate is needed about the nature of the threat, the gap
in authority that would exist without a force authorization, and the sensible
scope of an authorization to use force in response.
The comments of Blair and McChrystal, among many others,
nevertheless provide an important moment of pause, and a reminder of why
Congress should be cautious before embracing this approach. As they all
note, targeted killing operations may be creating more enemies than they are
98
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eliminating. Replacing the AUMF with an AQAP-specific statute—and
thereby condoning the permissive use of force vis-à-vis AQAP as a matter
of first resort going forward—might invite the very type of excessive
reliance on targeted killings that facilitate AQAP recruitment, induce an
increased focus on U.S. operations, and ultimately do us harm.100
IV. Conclusion
In his majority opinion in Boumediene v. Bush, Justice Anthony
Kennedy offered a sober reflection on the historical relationship between
the courts and the political branches with respect to the war powers. In his
words:
Because our Nation’s past military conflicts have been of
limited duration, it has been possible to leave the outer
boundaries of war powers undefined. If, as some fear,
terrorism continues to pose dangerous threats to us for years
to come, the Court might not have this luxury. This result is
not inevitable, however. The political branches, consistent
with their independent obligations to interpret and uphold the
Constitution, can engage in a genuine debate about how best
to preserve constitutional values while protecting the Nation
from terrorism.101
It seems beyond dispute that the target of Justice Kennedy’s rhetoric
was the AUMF—and the very real possibility that, absent thoughtful
legislative intervention, the courts would soon have to confront questions
that they have historically sidestepped about the scope of use-of-force
authorizations during wartime. And yet, not only have more than twelve
years passed since the AUMF was enacted, but the fifth anniversary of the
Boumediene decision has come and gone, and the AUMF remains in full
force. The time has come to take up Justice Kennedy’s invitation—to
“engage in a genuine debate about how best to preserve constitutional
values while protecting the Nation from terrorism.” Reasonable minds will
certainly disagree about the right answer, but an open-ended and
unnecessary expansion of the AUMF is clearly the wrong one.
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